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THE ITC IS HERE TO STAY: A DEFENSE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION’S
ROLE IN PATENT LAW
Linda Sun
ABSTRACT—The International Trade Commission (ITC) is a quasi-judicial
federal agency that is responsible for investigating unfair trade practices.
Although the ITC is widely believed to be an expert court in patent law, it
is often criticized for its role in the field. This Note advances a novel
analysis of the overlooked contributions of the ITC to the development and
enforcement of patent law. By exploring the background of the ITC, the
procedural advantages it offers, and the ways it substantively enriches
patent law doctrine, this Note concludes that the ITC is an important
player in patent law.
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INTRODUCTION
The International Trade Commission (“ITC”) is an “independent,
nonpartisan, quasi-judicial federal agency that fulfills a range of trade-
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related mandates.”1 Responsible for investigating unfair trade practices and
taking remedial action,2 it provides a venue for bringing forth a specific
type of patent infringement complaint: a complaint alleging that the
importation of certain products infringes a U.S. patent.3 The ITC also
determines whether the specified imported goods infringe domestic patent
rights and issues injunctions to prevent infringing goods from being
imported into the United States.4
The ITC is widely believed to be an expert court in patent law.5 This
expertise stems from the large number of patent cases it hears.6
Additionally, the ITC is exposed to a narrow range of technologies
compared to district courts, which facilitates the development of technical
expertise.7
Despite this expertise, most scholarship in the field of patent law is
critical of the ITC’s role in litigating patents. Some scholars argue that the
ITC has departed from its original mission of protecting domestic industry
and has become a patent validity court instead.8 The ITC has been called
redundant and conflicting in the face of other venues of patent litigation,
such as district courts.9 Additionally, the ITC has also been criticized for its
inflexible remedies.10 To that end, it has even been suggested that the ITC
should be abolished.11
1 About
the
USITC,
UNITED
STATES
INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
COMMISSION,
https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm [https://perma.cc/A46T-J274].
2 Robert A. Caplen, Recent Trends Underscoring International Trade Commission Review of Initial
Determinations and Federal Circuit Appeals from Final Commission Determinations under Section 337
of the Tariff Act of 1930, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 337, 339–40 (2007).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1702 (2009). See also Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the
Federal Circuit: An Expert Community Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 89 (2015).
6 Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1590 (2011).
7 Id. at 1590–91. See also FY 2017 at a Glance: Intellectual Property Import Investigations,
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.usitc.gov/documents
/yir_op2_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX74-3QDV] (stating that 38% of proceedings in 2017 involved
computer and telecommunications equipment; 13% involved pharmaceuticals and medical devices;
10% involved automotive, transportation, and manufacturing products; 6% involved consumer
electronics; and 33% involved other articles).
8 See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 67–71 (2008).
9 Id. at 71.
10 Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
11 Thomas F. Cotter, The International Trade Commission: Reform or Abolition? A Comment on
Colleen v. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L.
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However, critiques of the ITC neglect its major contributions to the
field of patent law. This Note provides an analysis of the procedural and
substantive advantages that allow the Commission to fulfill a unique role
in patent law. Part I of this Note provides background on the ITC and
its processes. Part II addresses the procedural advantages of the ITC.
Finally, Part III examines the advantages of the ITC in addressing
substantive patent law disputes.
I.

THE ITC

The ITC is a nonpartisan federal commission responsible for
investigating trade issues.12 The ITC “facilitates a rules-based international
trading system” by conducting investigations on import-related issues and
instituting remedies.13 For example, the ITC investigates allegations of
dumping, allegations of domestic patent infringement by imported goods,
and global safeguard cases.14 In such situations, the ITC has the power to
implement an injunction against further imports.15
There are six Commissioners at the ITC, each nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.16 The ITC also employs several
administrative law judges.17 In addition, the Commission’s Office of Unfair
Import Investigations (OUII) employs investigative attorneys.18 An
investigative attorney is assigned to each investigation and is tasked with
providing “‘objective’ advocacy” and “safeguard[ing] the ‘public
interest.’”19

REV. ONLINE 43, 54 (2013); Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the
ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 533 (2009).
12 About the USITC, supra note 1; U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, PUBLICATION NO.
4744, A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE USITC (2017) at 122, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/other
/pub4744.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN44-7XLN].
13 About the USITC, supra note 1.
14 About Import Injury Investigation, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
https://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy.htm [https://perma.cc/2L2P-JECW]. Dumping occurs when a
foreign manufacturer sells goods in the U.S. for less than a fair value. Global safeguard cases occur
when a U.S. industry is seriously injured by increased imports. Id.
15 § 29:55. International Trade Commission proceedings, 5 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 29:55 (5th ed.).
16 William P. Atkins & Justin A. Pan, An Updated Primer on Procedures and Rules in 337
Investigations at the U.S. International Trade Commission, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 105, 116
(2010).
17 Id. at 113–14.
18 Id. at 116.
19 Id.
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A. Mission of the ITC
The self-proclaimed mission of the ITC is threefold: to “(1) administer
U.S. trade remedy laws within its mandate in a fair and objective manner;
(2) provide the President, [the Office of the United States Trade
Representative], and Congress with independent analysis, information, and
support on matters of tariffs, international trade, and U.S. competitiveness;
and (3) maintain the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
(HTS).”20 Therefore, the mission of the ITC stems from international trade.
The Commission has five major operations that serve its mission. It
conducts (1) import injury investigations, (2) intellectual property-based
import investigations, (3) industry and economic analysis, (4) tariff and
trade information services, and (5) trade policy support.21 The ITC is
concerned with intellectual property and economics because of the
interplay with international trade.
B. History of the ITC
The ITC was established in 1916 as a tariff-focused organization
called the U.S. Tariff Commission.22 It was created to be an impartial
provider of facts and advice to Congress and the President regarding U.S.
customs tariffs.23 The Commission collected data, compiled reports, and
advised on the development of trade policy.24 Since then, the organization
has evolved to focus on administering trade remedy laws that address
international trade.25 For example, the Commission wrote a report in 1919
regarding dumping which influenced the Antidumping Act of 1921.26 The
Commission also contributed to the 1922 Tariff Act passed by Congress.27
In Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Congress gave the Commission
direct authority to address practices in U.S. import trade.28 The purpose of
the Tariff Act of 1930 was to “shield domestic industries from foreign
competitors.”29
20

About the USITC, supra note 1.
Id.
22 JOHN M. DOBSON, TWO CENTURIES OF TARIFFS: THE BACKGROUND AND EMERGENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 1–2 (1976), available at https://www.usitc.gov
/publications/332/pub0000.pdf [https://perma.cc/MYV7-5MMJ].
23 A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE USITC, supra note 12, at 122.
24 Id. at 123.
25 Id. at 124.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Joshua D. Furman, Reports of Section 337’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated: The ITC’s
Importance in an Evolving Patent Enforcement Environment, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 489, 490 (2015).
21

140

17:137 (2019)

The ITC is Here to Stay

The 1974 Trade Act instituted a major change in the Commission.
First of all, the U.S. Tariff Commission’s name was changed to what it is
today: the U.S. International Trade Commission.30 Most significantly, the
act “ma[d]e Section 337 proceedings before the Commission quasijudicial.”31 The act enabled trial-type procedures before administrative law
judges.32 Prior to the 1974 Trade Act, the President determined whether to
provide relief and what kind of relief was appropriate.33 Following the Act,
the President retained the power to disapprove action taken by the ITC for
policy reasons.34
Since the 1974 Trade Act, investigations under Section 337 have
increased significantly and now constitute a major part of the ITC’s
workload.35
C. Section 337
Section 337, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337, defines the manner in
which the ITC conducts investigations.36 When a complaint is filed, the
Commission determines whether the complaint has basis and complies with
the ITC’s rules.37 For example, ITC complaints have a two-pronged
domestic industry requirement: (1) economic and (2) technical.38 First, “[t]o
satisfy the economic prong, the complainant must show that it has made
‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ investment in domestic activities.”39 Further,
the complainant must engage in “(A) significant investment in plant and
equipment: (B) significant employment of labor or capital: or (C)
substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research
and development, or licensing.”40 Second, in regards to the technical prong,
the complainant “must show that it has a domestic product that practices at
least one claim of the asserted patent.”41
Once a complaint has been filed, the six Commissioners vote on
whether to institute an investigation.42 If an investigation is opened, an
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

DOBSON, supra note 22, at 1–2.
A CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE USITC, supra note 12, at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004).
Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 112.
Furman, supra note 29, at 493–94.
Id. at 494.
19 U.S.C. § 1337.
Furman, supra note 29, at 494.
Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 112.
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administrative law judge is assigned to preside over the case in a role
similar to that of a district court judge.43 The administrative law judge
issues initial determinations on matters such as whether there is a Section
337 violation and recommended remedies.44
The ITC cannot impose damages, but it has a variety of injunctive
remedies available.45 The ITC has the option to choose which products to
ban and the timing of the ban.46 For example, the ITC can issue general
exclusion orders, importation bans of all articles found to violate section
337, limited exclusion orders aimed only at the infringing products of the
named respondents, temporary exclusion orders which operate during the
pendency of the investigation, and both temporary and permanent cease
and desist orders.47
Initial determinations become final determinations unless the
Commission votes to review them.48 ITC final determinations then undergo
a sixty-day Presidential review period.49 During the review period,
continued importation may be permitted based upon payment of a bond set
by the ITC.50 The President can disapprove of any ITC order for policy
reasons.51 However, Presidential reversal of an ITC reversal is
exceptionally rare.52 ITC decisions may be appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.53
II. PROCEDURAL ADVANTAGES OF THE ITC
Through its “jurisdiction, remedies, and speed,” the ITC fills a void
left in patent law by district courts.54 When district courts are not a viable

43

Id. at 113–115.
Id. at 115; See David Long, ITC to consider ALJ’s decision and recommended exclusion order
on alleged SEPs that ALJ found were not essential to the LTO-7 standard (337-TA-1012 Fujifilm v.
Sony), ESSENTIAL PATENT BLOG (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2017/12/itcconsider-aljs-decision-recommended-exclusion-order-alleged-seps-alj-found-not-essential-lto-7standard-337-ta-1012-fujitsu-v-sony/ [https://perma.cc/6WQ7-CRQD].
45 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004).
46 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 32.
47 19 U.S.C. § 1337.
48 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 114.
49 Id. at 135.
50 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 32.
51 Id. at 31.
52 The two most recent reversals happened in 2013, under President Obama, and in 1987, under
President Reagan. The International Trade Commission: easier injunctive relief-except for StandardEssential Patent holders, LEXOLOGY, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=faebe6bc-bc5a4108-90f7-ddaf228eb2be [https://perma.cc/5A52-F88V].
53 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 32.
54 Chien, supra note 8, at 94.
44
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option due to high litigation costs, long timelines, lack of jurisdiction, or
inadequate remedies, the procedural advantages of the ITC help patent
holders safeguard their biggest investments. In a study of Section 337 cases
between 1995 and 2000, Section 337 cases were found to generally involve
valuable patents.55 The patents were more recent and had “more forward
citations, claims, and related patents abroad than did patents litigated in
federal district courts.”56 In addition, for import-heavy fields such as the
electronics industry, the ITC is uniquely capable of providing effective
remedies. 57
A. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the ITC allows it to address needs in patent law
and trade. The ITC has unique features that enable prosecution of foreign
infringers who would otherwise escape U.S. district courts.58 Foreign
defendants can take advantage of two scenarios that impede the judicial
enforcement of patent rights in domestic courts: (1) where the court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the infringer, and (2) where the identity of the
foreign manufacturer is unknown and legal recourse is unlikely.59 The ITC
closes these loopholes and puts foreign defendants on notice of U.S. patent
rights.
The ITC has “in rem” jurisdiction, which arises from the importation
of products.60 Thus, jurisdiction over foreign companies is easy to obtain as
long as the foreign companies are importing products.61 In addition, the
55

Id. at 81.
Id. See also Catherine Y. Co, How Valuable are the Patents Behind Section 337 Cases?, 27
WORLD ECON. 525, 529–32 (2004) (claiming that the number of forward citations, patent claims, and
related patents abroad may be indicators of patent value); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92
GEO. L.J. 435, 438 (2004) (stating that valuable patents tend to be young, are more likely to be cited,
and contain more claims than ordinary patents). But see David S. Abrams & Bhaven N. Sampat, What’s
the Value of Patent Citations? Evidence from Pharmaceuticals (Preliminary Draft) (2017) (concluding
that citations to drug patents are weakly related to the value of the patents),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/clbe/events/innovation/documents
/AbramsSampatDrugCites060917.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL75-9Z8S].
57 Christopher A. Cotropia, Strength of the International Trade Commission As A Patent Venue, 20
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 5 (2011) (stating that in the electronics industry, most products containing
patented technology are manufactured abroad and imported into the United States).
58 Colleen V. Chien & David L. Schwartz, Empirical Studies of the International Trade
Commission, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 175,
175 (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz eds., 2019) [hereinafter Empirical Studies].
59 K. William Watson, Still a Protectionist Trade Remedy: The Case for Repealing Section 337,
708 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 8 (2012).
60 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 110.
61 See Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 177. With in rem jurisdiction over accused imports,
personal jurisdiction over accused respondents does not need to be established. Moreover, in rem
jurisdiction allows a complainant to bring a single action against multiple respondents located in
56
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Commission has nationwide personal jurisdiction.62 In contrast, venue and
personal jurisdiction rules in district courts may deny standing in the same
cases.63 The ITC’s expansive jurisdiction may be one reason some patent
holders engage in ITC litigation even when they have a parallel case in
district courts: ITC litigation enables them to capture foreign entities.64
B. Lack of Jury in ITC Section 337 Proceedings
In district courts, the jury is responsible for determining infringement
and remedies; however, jury verdicts are “often unpredictable and
inconsistent”.65 Most juries do not understand patent law or the
technologies that are litigated.66 Juries can be influenced by brand loyalty
and are often compelled by storytelling.67 This level of uncertainty is
socially inefficient and cuts against utilitarian justifications of patent law.68
For example, even an insignificant patent could command a high settlement
from defendants afraid of gambling on a jury’s decision.69 In fact, federal
judges have advocated for eliminating juries from patent cases.70
In contrast, ITC proceedings do not involve juries. Infringement and
remedies are determined by an administrative law judge who is
experienced in patent law. The proceedings are aided by staff attorneys
different jurisdictions. For example, in a recent Section 337 investigation, the complaint named 25
respondents from seven states and five countries. Russel E. Levine, The Benefits of Using the ITC,
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Sept. 2004, at 25, 28, https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles
/kirkexp/publications/2386/Document1/Levine_MIP.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZTT6-9VA9].
62 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 110.
63 Cotropia, supra note 57, at 5.
64 In one study of cases that were filed both in the ITC and district courts, “while 85% of the ITC
cases named at least one foreign respondent, only 67% of district court cases did.” Chien, supra note 8,
at 93–94.
65 Joel C. Johnson, Lay Jurors in Patent Litigation: Reviving the Active, Inquisitorial Model for
Juror Participation, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 339, 340 (2004).
66 Michael A. Fisher, Going for the Blue Ribbon: The Legality of Expert Juries in Patent Litigation,
2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001).
67 Jeff Roberts, 3 reasons juries have no place in the patent system, GIGAOM (Aug. 27, 2012),
https://gigaom.com/2012/08/27/3-reasons-juries-have-no-place-in-the-patent-system/
[https://perma.cc/3DLZ-SD7K].
68 The historic justifications behind our patent system are utilitarian. The theory is that patents
should provide enough property rights to help recoup costs of invention, therefore incentivizing
innovation for the greater public. David S. Olsen, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law
Seriously: The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 183 (2009).
69 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 8.
70 Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, THE ATLANTIC,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-inamerica/259725/#.T_7jUH2JTJg.facebook [https://perma.cc/3Z5J-628A]. However, some litigators
note that trial judges who have no technical background or exposure to patent law are no better than a
jury. Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, 4 DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 1, 33
(2004).
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who also have patent law expertise. While certain positive aspects of jury
trials would be lost, the net benefit of an expert fact-finder outweighs the
losses.71
C. Speediness of ITC Section 337 Proceedings
ITC proceedings are typically much faster than district court
proceedings. In fact, the ITC is known as the “fastest patent court in the
country.”72 The average Section 337 investigation in 2008 was roughly one
year and four months, whereas the average for the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia was three years and eight months.73
The need for speed is stated in Section 337 itself: Investigations are
required to conclude “at the earliest practicable time.”74 The Commission
must establish a target date for completion of the investigation in order to
“promote expeditious adjudication.”75 The administrative law judge
assigned to the case must issue an initial determination on the issues no less
than four months before the target date.76
Due to these time constraints, ITC proceedings generally do not offer
stays for inter partes review proceedings, whereas district court
proceedings do so more often.77 In addition, counterclaims filed in ITC
investigations are automatically removed to a district court.78 Both of these
factors hasten ITC proceedings.
The speedy nature of Section 337 proceedings is due to the
Commission’s mission of regulating trade.79 Waiting years to provide
injunctive relief, which is typical of district courts, “may be too long to
71 See Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 825 (2001) (stating advantages of jury trials, such as fostering
democratic participation, reducing the probability for bias, and a relatively quick verdict).
72 Schwartz, supra note 5, at 1724.
73 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 129.
74 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004).
75 Id.
76 Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 179.
77 Id. An ITC case will typically finish more quickly than an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding.
Eric J. Fues, The Interplay Between the ITC and PTAB—More Progress Needed, BLOOMBERG LAW
(2019),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-interplay-between-the-itc-and-the-ptabmoreprogress-needed.html [https://perma.cc/86Q8-ATEA]. However, a final written decision reached in an
IPR could heavily impact the ITC’s decision. In 2018, for the first time, the ITC stayed a violationphase Section 337 investigation based on an IPR final written decision. There were unusual
circumstances that caused the ITC investigation schedule to be pushed behind the IPR schedule.
February 2019: ITC Treatment of IPR Decisions, QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP
(March 2, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/february-2019-itc-treatment-of-ipr-65955/
[https://perma.cc/UZ44-8NGM].
78 Chien, supra note 8, at 77.
79 Furman, supra note 29, at 525.
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effectively protect domestic industries.”80 While critics argue that the ITC
does not protect domestic industries against foreign competitors because
many cases involve domestic defendants, the domestic defendants in
question actually engage in manufacturing abroad and then import to the
United States.81 By allowing a claim to be filed against a domestic entity,
the ITC prevents foreign competitors from escaping scrutiny by acquiring a
U.S. subsidiary.
D. Remedies Available at the ITC
Under Section 337, the ITC is limited to injunctive remedies and
cannot award damages.82 This simplifies remedy calculations. Generally,
damage calculations are very difficult and frequently require economic
experts to determine a fair monetary remedy.
District courts can also award injunctions. However, district courts
must balance common law considerations and apply the four-factor eBay
test when awarding injunctions.83 This is a complex process that can result
in increased litigation costs. In contrast, the ITC is not bound by this test.84
The ITC is free to award injunctions whenever infringement is found.
In fact, that is largely what the ITC does. Injunctions are almost
always issued after a finding of infringement, further simplifying remedy
determinations.85 Prevailing patentees are “essentially guaranteed” to be
granted injunctions in the ITC, whereas injunctions are less common in
district courts.86
The ITC’s issuance of injunctions has been accused of causing patent
holdups.87 Specifically, the ITC has been criticized for providing a venue
where patent assertion entities and patent trolls can run free, unchecked by

80

Id.
Chien, supra note 8, at 89.
82 Atkins & Pan, supra note 16, at 111.
83 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“A plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships
between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
84 Chien, supra note 8, at 109.
85 Cotropia, supra note 57, at 6.
86 Chien, supra note 8, at 99.
87 See J. Gregory Sidak, International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of
Standard-Essential Patents, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 145–46 (2016). A patent holdup
occurs when a patent holder requests more than reasonable royalties because it can hold the threat of an
injunction over the other party’s head. J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the
Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 714, 714 (2008).
81
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eBay.88 However, without the ITC’s remedy of injunctions, reverse holdup
could be facilitated.89 More importantly, the ITC has dealt with the problem
of patent assertion entities by changing other policies, therefore preserving
the benefits of providing only injunctions as remedies. For instance, the
ITC modified its requirements for Section 337 proceedings multiple times
to limit participation by patent assertion entities.90
The ITC can also grant general exclusion orders, “a special remedy
available only in the ITC that excludes infringing items regardless of
source.”91 A general exclusion order allows a patent holder to simply block
infringers without having to file separate complaints against various
manufacturers and chase down infringers who open up shops under
different names.92 This remedy sweeps away legal steps required by district
courts.
ITC determinations regarding remedies are also difficult to reverse.93
The Federal Circuit reverses the ITC’s remedies only when they are
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”94 This is a high bar that is difficult to surpass. Patent
holders can have confidence in remedies given by the ITC and competitors
are put on notice, with the caveat that the Federal Circuit applies a more
stringent standard of review to substantive patent law determinations made
by the ITC.95
III. SUBSTANTIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE ITC
The ITC substantively contributes to the field of patent law by
providing valuable perspectives that are percolated up the courts; in
particular, the ITC provides a multidisciplinary view of patent law by
88 COLLEEN V. CHIEN, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PATENT DISPUTES 3 (2012),
available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1437&context=facpubs
[https://perma.cc/J5CQ-YHB6].
89 Sidak, International Trade Commission Exclusion Orders for the Infringement of StandardEssential Patents, supra note 87, at 150. Reverse hold-ups occur when patent holders are undercompensated for the value of their innovation. Damien Geradin, Reverse Hold-Ups: The (Often
Ignored) Risks Faced By Innovators In Standardized Areas, in SWEDISH COMPETITION AUTHORITY,
THE PROS AND CONS OF STANDARD SETTING, 101, 104 (2010), available at
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/english/research/read-the-book-14mb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ATN9-HVTX].
90 Josh Landau, International Trade, Not Interrupted Trade - Trolls and the ITC, PATENT
PROGRESS
(June
30,
2017),
https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/06/30/trolls-itc
[https://perma.cc/Q8V9-V8ZV]; Furman, supra note 29, at 528–29.
91 Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 177.
92 Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 177.
93 Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 31.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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incorporating trade considerations.96 Percolation is usually discussed in the
context of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is responsible for
“[r]econciling discrepancies in the law and filling voids in doctrine.”97 The
Supreme Court is able to make a more informed decision on a legal issue
that is “well-percolated,” meaning multiple lower courts have weighed in.98
Typically, this is by way of the various regional circuit courts of appeals.
However, the Federal Circuit hears all patent appeals.99 Therefore, in the
context of patent law, the Federal Circuit can also be considered a top
decision maker that benefits from the percolation of legal issues.100
The Federal Circuit hears appeals from patent cases originating in
district courts, the ITC, and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). In
an area of law that lacks uncoordinated review by regional circuits of
appeals, the separate patent litigation venues can “encourage [examination]
and [criticism of] each other’s decisions, which . . . can generate solutions
that are not obvious on a first or second look.”101 In addition, the district
courts, ITC, and PTAB can “experiment with different legal rules” which
provides the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court with “concrete information
about the consequences of various options.”102
A system without percolation creates a risk of locking the law into one
mode of operation.103 It can result in “excessive uniformity, losing the
useful debate . . . that leads to evolution of patent legal theory.”104
Specialized judges may be subject to “tunnel vision” or be overly
influenced by special interest groups.105 The ITC provides viewpoints on
patent law that the district courts and PTAB do not offer.

96 Pedraza, supra note 5, at 141 (arguing that patent law should incorporate multiple types of
expertise).
97 Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Supreme Court and Percolation in the Lower Courts:
An Optimal Stopping Model, 75 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS 150, 152 (2013).
98 Id.
99 Court Jurisdiction, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/the-court/court-jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/U6GP-SKFH].
100 See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 703 (2009).
101 Id. at 701.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Holly Lance, Not So Technical: An Analysis of Federal Circuit Patent Decisions Appealed from
the ITC, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 247 (2010).
105 Golden, supra note100, at 674; see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787,
802–03 (2008) (cautioning that the Federal Circuit has made the law more precise at the expense of
quality).
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A. The ITC as a Patent Specialized Court
The ITC provides a unique patent-specialized trial court perspective
on patent law that is percolated to the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court.
In a highly technical area of law such as patent law, an understanding
of the science and technology behind the patents at issue can be critical to
making a fair and correct ruling.106 Specialized intellectual property courts
may be “better equipped to keep pace with and adapt to dynamic
developments in [intellectual property] law,” and can develop rules that are
tailored to intellectual property disputes.107 Specialized judges would
become more proficient in patent law, which would “likely reduce the cost
and length” of trials.108 For these reasons, many industrial nations have
specialized patent trial courts or panels.109 For example, Japan has
specialized divisions of district and appeals courts that handle intellectual
property matters.110 Greece staffs their Specialized Intellectual Property
Right Divisions with judges with expertise in intellectual property rights.111
A 2012 study on specialized intellectual property courts conducted by the
International Intellectual Property Institute and the USPTO found that
specialized intellectual property courts “often make quicker and more
effective decisions.”112
The ITC can be viewed as a patent-specialized trial court because of
its similarities to specialized trial courts: almost all of the ITC’s cases are
patent infringement violations.113 Although the administrative law judges of
the ITC have a variety of backgrounds, they “acquire extensive experience
in patent law and are widely regarded as experts.”114 While the PTAB is
also patent-specialized, it is more limited than the ITC in the type of issues

106 Study on Specialized Intellectual Property Courts, INT’L INTELL. PROP. INST. & U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. 5–6 (Jan. 25, 2012), https://iipi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Study-onSpecialized-IPR-Courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB95-3MCA].
107 Jacques de Werra, A Closer Look at Specialized Intellectual Property Courts, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG. (Nov. 2016), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2016/si/article_0009.html
[https://perma.cc/X3G6-QAQU].
108 Gregory J. Wallace, Toward Certainty and Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases after Festo
and Markman: A Proposal for a Specialized Patent Trial Court with a Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1383, 1414 (2004).
109 Id. at 1410.
110 Study on Specialized Intellectual Property Courts, supra note 106, at 4.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 5.
113 Lance, supra note 104, at 245, 249.
114 Kumar, supra note 6, at 1555.
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it can hear.115 The presence of the ITC provides the benefits of a patentspecialized court within the larger framework of percolation.
B. The ITC Provides a Trade and Policy Perspective
With its basis in international trade regulation, the ITC puts a policy
and trade lens on patent law. By being a part of the large patent law
landscape, the ITC allows views of patent law influenced by public policy
and trade to percolate. This broadens how decisions are made and
decreases the chance of a “tunnel vision” view of patent law.116
Congress specifically instructed the ITC to consider the public policy
of promoting free competition, which “suggests that Congress wanted the
ITC to use a nuanced approach in determining patent validity and
enforceability, with a focus on protecting U.S. businesses from the negative
side-effects of free trade.”117 The ITC has unique trade expertise; the
agency investigates trade issues from dumping to tariffs and possesses
broad knowledge about trade practices that harm U.S. companies.118 This
broad base of information is utilized by the ITC in its determinations of
patent validity and remedies. In fact, the law requires the ITC to utilize this
information. For example, before implementing an exclusion order, the ITC
is required to consider whether the exclusion order is “inconsistent with the
public interest, with input from other regulatory agencies.”119 The ITC is
also able to order public hearings to determine whether such exclusion
orders would harm the public.120 In contrast, district courts are not equipped
or required to consider issues of trade and foreign policy.121
A unique element of Section 337 proceedings is the participation of an
investigative attorney (or “staff attorney”) from the Office of Unfair Import
Investigations.122 Each proceeding has a staff attorney who “participates in
discovery, motions, and trial, creating a different case dynamic than that
experienced in district court.”123 The staff attorney is a full party to the
investigation and “functions as an independent litigant representing the

115 The PTAB can only hear patent validity issues under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103 wherein patents
or printed publications are relied on. 37 C.F.R. §42.104 (2019).
116 See Kumar, supra note 6, at 1602.
117 H.R. Rep. No. 93–571 (1973), at 78; Kumar, supra note 6, at 1591.
118 Kumar, supra note 6, at 1591.
119 Empirical Studies, supra note 58, at 180.
120 Kumar, supra note 6, at 1595.
121 Id. at 1591–92.
122 Id. at 1595.
123 Chien, supra note 8, at 79–80.
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public interest.”124 The addition of a neutral party who advocates for free
trade adds a unique perspective to ITC proceedings.
In addition, the President has the authority to veto injunctions issued
under Section 337 proceedings based on policy reasons.125 These policy
reasons include: “(1) public health and welfare; (2) competitive conditions
in the U.S. economy; (3) production of competitive articles in the United
States; (4) U.S. consumers; and (5) U.S. foreign relations, economic and
political.”126 The President’s decision cannot be appealed to the Federal
Circuit.127 The fact that the President can veto ITC decisions makes the ITC
a better-positioned forum to make policy decisions as compared to district
courts, which are not under the executive branch’s purview.128 Therefore,
the ITC is able to incorporate more policy considerations into its patent
cases without the same decision costs of district courts. At times, a
Presidential veto results in a narrowed or altered remedy from the ITC.129
Incorporating the President’s point of view adds another dimension to ITC
patent decisions that sets them apart from district court decisions. Thus, the
ITC adds diversity and important public interest considerations to the body
of patent law doctrine that informs the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court.
C. Flexibility of the ITC
The ITC and its processes have been substantively amended since the
ITC’s inception. With each change, the ITC has become better suited to
address patent issues. The flexibility of the ITC contributes to its important
presence in the patent law landscape.
Prior to the 1980’s, a patent holder had to show both infringement and
economic injury to a domestic industry in order to qualify for a Section 337
investigation.130 This meant universities and small companies were
excluded from ITC proceedings because they did not engage in
manufacturing.131 In response, Congress passed the 1988 Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act that relaxed the domestic industry and injury

124
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126 Landon J. Greene, Alternate Reality: Limiting the Scope of Presidential Authority Under § 337,
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requirements.132 Section 337 was amended to no longer require injury and
to consider licensing as a form of industry.133
In response to a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
ruling that found Section 337 to violate international law, Congress
changed Section 337 to loosen time limits, allow counterclaims, allow stays
of district court litigation, and increase requirements for general exclusion
orders in 1994.134 This allowed the ITC to provide general exclusion orders
when warranted while easing GATT concerns over the differences between
district court and ITC remedies.135
The eBay injunction standard addressed the problem of patent
assertion entity or patent troll claims in district courts.136 However, applying
eBay to the ITC would make the ITC redundant and leave it unable to
appropriately address unfair trade practices.137 Instead, the ITC used a
“more trade forum-appropriate lever.”138 In 2014, the ITC tightened its
domestic industry standards, which reduced the number of patent assertion
entities filing Section 337 cases.139 The Commission reversed decades of
practice, ruling that to fulfill the domestic industry requirement based on
licensing, a complainant must produce an article that practices the asserted
patent.140 Further, the Commission held that to fulfill the domestic industry
requirement based on research and development activities, a complainant
must prove that there is a nexus between the U.S. based research and
development and the asserted patent.141 In response, patent assertion entities
started to work around the new domestic industry standards: they would
sue a company, settle, provide a license to the company, and then subpoena
the company to provide documentation in the Section 337 proceeding to
show the patent assertion entity satisfies the domestic industry requirement.
In response, Congress has introduced the “Trade Protection, Not Troll
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1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 100–418 §1342, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988).
134 Chien, supra note 8, at 77 (quoting Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465,
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135 Furman, supra note 29, at 502.
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137 Furman, supra note 29, at 528–29.
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Protection” bill.142 The bill tightens the domestic industry requirement again
such that any licensing must lead to a product; licensing that happens after
a product already exists is not sufficient.143 In addition, any licensees who
provide proof of domestic industry must join the ITC case voluntarily,
preventing the “domestic industry by subpoena” problem.144 In sum, the
ITC has proven through its history that it has the ability to adapt to an
evolving patent landscape.
CONCLUSION
Critics overlook the pro-utilitarian aspects of the ITC as a patent
litigation venue. The jurisdiction, lack of jury, fast proceedings, and
remedies provided by the Commission protect incentives for innovation. In
addition, the ITC provides important patent-specialized and trade-focused
viewpoints that add to the development of substantive patent law doctrine.
Overall, the procedural and substantive advantages of the Commission
establish it as an important player in U.S. patent law. As long as it
continues to be flexible and react appropriately to changes in patent law,
the ITC is here to stay.

142 Trade Protection Not Troll Protection Act, H.R. 2189, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2189 [https://perma.cc/69XR-LY3S].
143 Id.
144 Id.
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